Suchergebnisse

Four lectures delivered by the author at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study in 2007 on literary criticism

The vulnerable side of nativism in literature is that it cannot advocate the use of American subject matter without at once demanding of the writer that he declare himself in advance to stand in an affirmative relation to it. Nativists can never understand that any attempt to enlist literature 'in the cause of America' is bound to impose an intolerable strain on the writer's creative imagination. The real issue in the times of Emerson & Whitman was not between love of America & disdain of it; neither Cooper nor Hawthorne nor James disdained it. The issue was rather the availability at home of creatively usable materials. At the present time, when the issue of poverty of materials can no longer arise in America, the habit of demanding affirmation still persists. We are living in a period of renewed national belligerency, when pessimism is again regarded as 'un-American'. In many circles so recent a lesson as that taught us in the 1920's, when US writing showed far more creative force than it does now even while engaging in a bitter assault on the national pieties, has been conveniently forgotten. Now, as then, the appeal to 'the sanely & wholesomely American' is taken up as a weapon against the moral freedom of literatures. Art has always fed on the contradiction between reality of the world & the image of glory. J. A. Fishman.

This paper surveys the history of nativism in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the present. It compares a recent surge in nativism with earlier periods, particularly the decades leading up to the 1920s, when nativism directed against southern and eastern European, Asian, and Mexican migrants led to comprehensive legislative restrictions on immigration. It is based primarily on a review of historical literature, as well as contemporary immigration scholarship. Major findings include the following:• There are many similarities between the nativism of the 1870–1930 period and today, particularly the focus on the purported inability of specific immigrant groups to assimilate, the misconception that they may therefore be dangerous to the native-born population, and fear that immigration threatens American workers.• Mexican migrants in particular have been consistent targets of nativism, immigration restrictions, and deportations.• There are also key differences between these two eras, most apparently in the targets of nativism, which today are undocumented and Muslim immigrants, and in President Trump's consistent, highly public, and widely disseminated appeals to nativist sentiment.• Historical studies of nativism suggest that nativism does not disappear completely, but rather subsides. Furthermore, immigrants themselves can and do adopt nativist attitudes, as well as their descendants.• Politicians, government officials, civic leaders, scholars and journalists must do more to reach sectors of society that feel most threatened by immigration.• While eradicating nativism may be impossible, a focus on avoiding or overturning nativist immigration legislation may prove more successful.

Recent literature on the centre–periphery debate in European politics has produced a wide range of composite paradigms of regionalism, nationalism, and populism and nativism. A number of these definitions, however, tend to overemphasise the importance of populism by either framing it as a core ideology or by conflating it with the nationalism or regionalism of a specific party. This article makes three innovative contributions to populist studies by sustaining an ideational approach to populism and its combination with regionalist and nationalist ideologies. First, the article addresses the varied and at times conflicting composite paradigms of regionalism, nationalism, and populism by proposing a minimalist 'populist regionalist' and 'populist nationalist' conceptual framework; this places the emphasis on the type of nationalism and regionalism (left- or right-wing, civic or ethnic) to which populism and (potentially) nativism are attached. Second, by emphasising a clear distinction between populism and nativism, the article adds to a growing field of literature which aims to address the problem of 'populist hype'. Finally, the contribution of a brief comparative case study illustrates how populism represents a key link between nationalists and regionalists ranging from the far-left to the far-right which are otherwise separated by nativism.

La historia del nativismo ha sido exhaustivamente estudiada y analizada. Uno de sus aspectos más controvertidos se refiere a la relación entre nativismo y populismo. Su naturaleza exacta no está, sin embargo, clara, y requiere más investigación. El principal objetivo de este artículo es arrojar luz sobre una cuestión que se dirige al centro mismo del debate actual sobre el populismo de derechas: cuál es el lugar y el papel del nativismo en la movilización populista ; The history of nativism has been exhaustively studied and analyzed. One of the most controversial aspects of this literature pertains to the relationship between nativism and populism. Its exact nature, however, is unclear and calls for investigation. The main objective of this article is to shed light on a question that goes to the very heart of the current debate on radical right-wing populism: namely, what is the place and role of nativism in populist mobilization

Kolatkar's poetry corresponds to Rancière's definition of the literary as realm of "dissensus", undoing strict delineating frontiers. Kolatkar refuses to draw the line between what is included and excluded – both in the space of the Bombay he portrays (and specifically the Kala Ghoda neighborhood) or in the space of writing itself, since the space of writing is linked to the space of the nation and frontiers of perception correspond to geopolitical frontiers. His poetry does not excise strangeness but makes it visible. It thrives on the "refusal of the world", on people and objects abandoned at the margins of the nation and of our ordinary perception. It also celebrates those who oppose the certainties of identity and the sacredness of the nation (A. Appadurai). It hence subverts the ideology of Hindu nationalism that has been trying to restore an Indian-Hindu essence by purging history, language, and identity from so-called foreign, minor, or inauthentic elements. Kolatkar constantly exposes the historicity of identity and of language against nativism, the hospitality of poetics against the politics of expurgation.

The subject of this thesis is William Carlos Williams and the circle of writers around him in the 1930s. During this decade Williams was a key figure in the formation of an alternative left-wing American canon, and active in a group that included Nathanael West, Louis Zukofsky and Kenneth Burke. This thesis explores the political and aesthetic grounds on which that canon was constructed. The assumption that Williams was already a successful writer after Spring and All (1923) has often led to a disproportionate emphasis on his poetry and the 'modernist' aspects of his aesthetics. This thesis makes the case for the significance of Williams' 1930s prose writings in the growth of the Proletarian Literature movement, and challenges the assumption that 'Marxist' literature of the 1930s was at odds with 'modernist' literature of the 1920s. I investigate the key concepts of Williams' own aesthetic philosophy, 'Objectivism,' 'Pragmatism,' 'Contact,' and 'Localism,' and show how these concepts became politicized during the 1930s. By exploring the relationship between art and politics, and the ways in which Williams was radicalized by the Great Depression, this thesis attempts to expand critical notions of 'radicalism' to include a broader New Deal alliance between traditional democratic liberalism and Marxist economic determinism. Focusing on concepts of 'Nativism' and 'Americanism,' this thesis also charts America's burgeoning cultural nationalism during the 1930s, and demonstrates how America's founding values were challenged by political, economic and social upheaval in the wake of the Depression. By locating Williams' desire for radical economic change within the context of the Jeffersonian movement, I demonstrate how a historical assessment of America's past led Williams and the writers mentioned above to question America's attitudes towards individualism, the redistribution of wealth, the forces of corruption and plutocracy, and the effectiveness of democracy to bring about social justice.

Intro -- Nativism and Modernity -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- INTRODUCTION: Interrogating (through) the Native -- 1. Of Alter/Natives, Margins,and Post/Modernity at the Rim -- 2. Beneath the Claims of Native Soil -- 3. Beyond the Reach of Roots -- 4. Gendering Natives, Engendering Alternatives -- POSTSCRIPT: Place-Based Politics inChina and Taiwan Today -- Notes -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Y -- Z -- SUNY SERIES, EXPLORATIONS IN POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES.

Pundits, development practitioners, and scholars worry that rising populism and international disengagement in developed countries have negative consequences on foreign aid. However, how populism and foreign aid go together is not well understood. This paper provides the first systematic examination of this relationship. We adopt the popular ideational definition of populism, unpack populism into its core "thin" elements, and examine them within a delegation model of aid policy—a prominent framework in the aid literature. In so doing, we identify specific domestic political processes through which the core components of populism may affect aid spending. We argue that increases in one component of populism—anti-elitism—and in nativist sentiments, an associated concept, in a donor country lead to a reduction in aid spending through a public opinion channel. We supply both micro- and macro-evidence for our arguments by fielding surveys in the United States and United Kingdom as well as by analyzing aid spending by a large number of OECD donors. Our findings show that nativism and anti-elitism, rather than populism per se, influence not only individual attitudes toward aid but also actual aid policy and generate important insights into how to address populist challenges to foreign aid. Beyond these, our study contributes to the broader International Relations literature by demonstrating one useful analytical approach to studying populism, nativism, and foreign policy.

AbstractFor Dauvergne (2016), one consequence of the "end of settler societies" is nativism, or what she calls "mean‐spirited politics": anti‐immigrant, anti‐Muslim, anti‐Multiculturalism. This accords with the prevailing tone of public opinion literature on the subject, which links anti‐immigrant hostility in settler societies to influxes of diversity and associated racial threat. In this essay, we determine just how closely this stylized vision of anxiety‐fuelled nativism resembles the true state of mass opinion about immigration. Using a variety of surveys fielded in recent years, we show that Americans: 1) hold generally positive views about immigration, though with a substantial dose of ambivalence about its consequences; 2) are not especially consistent in their policy attitudes over time; 3) express policy attitudes that readily depart from their underlying predispositions, and; 4) have only become more pro‐immigrant in recent years, and whatever partisan polarization exists on the issue stems from the fact that Republicans are becoming more positive at a slightly slower pace than Democrats. All of this suggests that, while there is a hard core of ethnocentrism and "mean‐spiritedness" in the U.S., the prevailing tone is much less negative than the standard portrayal assumes.

The past three decades have seen the entry and increased influence of radical right parties into the European party landscape. These parties harness disaffection with the status quo by appealing to nativist or authoritarian tendencies in the electorate. Their policies often center around the protection of the "common man" from foreign or elite forces (particularly, cultural and economic globalization) and their emergence has been linked to decreasing support for globalization—the so-called "globalization backlash." Several authors note that although radical right parties advocate economic protectionism to attract voters, who are disaffected by globalization, they say little about how this is manifested in advocacy of concrete policy measures. This speaks to the need for more systematic study of the trade policies of radical right parties. This article studies the Swedish radical right party, the Sweden Democrats (ostensibly free traders), to advance an argument based on the core ideology of radical right parties, nativism, and populism. In doing so, the article contributes to the literature that stresses cultural rather than economic foundations for opposition to globalization. Moreover, this article widens the definition of protectionism from that germane to the literature on radical right parties to include non-tariff barriers to trade (in addition to tariffs and quotas), providing a more up-to-date and multifaceted account of the range of trade policy instruments that radical right parties may advocate. I find that populism inspires advocacy of liberal trade policies, while nativism inspires protectionist trade policies. Protectionism almost exclusively consists of non-tariff barriers.

Intro -- Series Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Praise for Populism, Nativism, and Economic Uncertainty -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Abstract -- References -- Chapter 2 Literature Review -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Economic Threat -- 2.3 Nativism -- 2.4 Populism -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3 Methods -- Abstract -- 3.1 The CSES, and the BES, GLES, and FES of 2017 -- 3.2 The Dependent Variable -- 3.3 The Independent Variables -- 3.4 Modeling Strategy -- 3.5 Hypotheses -- 3.5.1 Poisson Regression: Modeling Anti-immigrant Sentiment -- 3.5.2 Logistic Regression 1: Modeling Right-Wing Vote (Absent Anti-immigrant Sentiment) -- 3.5.3 Logistic Regression 1: Modeling Right-Wing Vote While Controlling for Anti-immigrant Sentiment -- References -- Chapter 4 France 2017 -- Abstract -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Institutional Context and Background to French Elections -- 4.3 2017 French Presidential Election Narrative -- 4.4 Discussion -- References -- Chapter 5 Great Britain 2017 -- Abstract -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The British Institutional Context -- 5.3 Background Narrative to the 2017 UK General Election -- 5.4 Discussion -- References -- Chapter 6 Germany 2017 -- Abstract -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The German Institutional Context -- 6.3 German 2017 Bundestag Election Narrative -- 6.4 Discussion -- References -- Chapter 7 Comparing Across the 2017 Elections in Britain, France, and Germany -- Abstract -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Anti-immigrant Sentiment Comparison -- 7.3 Right-Wing Vote Comparisons -- 7.4 Discussion and Conclusions -- Reference -- Chapter 8 Discussion/Conclusion -- Abstract -- 8.1 Discussion -- 8.2 Conclusion -- References -- Appendix A -- Appendix B-Comparative Model Estimated First Differences -- Index.